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Abstract 
 
Focusing on Europe and the United States, and using policy/regulatory document 
analysis, qualitative interviews, and quantitative cost-scenario analysis, we explore 
regulatory and market influences on the commercial development of novel 
antimicrobial drugs and diagnostics to meet the global antimicrobial resistance crisis. 
We show that regulation of clinical trials previously inhibited firms’ ability to develop 
commercially viable antimicrobials, but now unattractive commercial prospects are the 
main barrier. Our findings improve understanding of the challenges of drug 
development in the context of market failure and highlight unique problems of 
antimicrobial resistance in terms of the alignment of different incentive structures and 
value(s), including clinical norms and practices.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) – the evolutionary ability of microbes to acquire 
resistance to drugs targeting them – is a global crisis (Davies, 2013) requiring national 
and international policy responses (O’Neill, 2016; OECD, 2016; WHO 2014; HOC, 2014). 
The danger is a return to a pre-antibiotic era, bringing catastrophic consequences for 
public health, and taken-for-granted medical advances over the past 50 years. For 
example, reducing risks of routine surgery sometimes requires prophylactic use of 
antibiotics, and life-threatening infections have been treatable for decades through 
antimicrobials.  However, resistance is outpacing the discovery of novel drugs. Data 
from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) show from 
2005 to 2015, AMR increased on average by 5% in 23 out of 26 OECD countries, with 
some infections increasing four-fold (OECD, 2016).   
 
AMR is a systemic and complex global problem, with salient differences between 
high and low-resource countries in the quality of healthcare and access to diagnostic 
testing and therapy providing unique selection environments. A range of solutions are 
needed that integrate knowledge and understanding of innovation communities, 
regulatory bodies and governance processes, stakeholder groups, and broader socio-
economic factors that drive transmission dynamics. We explore the drug development 
challenges for AMR, focusing on regulation-innovation interactions and market factors 
that can inhibit or incentivise antimicrobial drug development. Focusing on Europe and 
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the US, we show that regulation previously inhibited firms’ ability to develop 
commercially viable antimicrobials, but now lack of financial incentives is the main 
barrier.  
 
The following section outlines our methods. We then provide some background 
to the AMR problem, before looking at regulatory challenges and their impact on 
antimicrobial drug development. We discuss a tiered labelling approach for 
antimicrobials, illustrating changes in regulatory standards, and consider subsequent 
R&D investment scenarios. Finally, we discuss how lack of financial incentives for 
industry and prevailing clinical norms and diagnostic practices hinder AMR drug 
development. Note that we see two likely settings in which new antimicrobials will be 
used. These are: (1) in the hospital setting for patients with serious acute infections 
where there is evidence that established drugs are unlikely to be effective given the 
resistance profile of the pathogens at hand; and (2) as high priced “orphan drugs” in 
certain high-risk populations outside of hospital, e.g. patients with cystic fibrosis with 
chronic Pseudomonas aeruginosa infection.  However, we would expect initial approval 
for use primarily in hospital populations with serious acute infections, where the drug is 
likely to be delivered intravenously (although reimbursement would be similar for an 
oral medication), so our analysis applies mainly to this scenario.  
 
 
Methods 
 
Data were collected in 2014 as part of an ESRC project, ‘Independent Review on Anti-
Microbial Resistance’, which contributed to the O’Neill ‘Review on Antimicrobial 
Resistance’ (O’Neill, 2016). We reviewed academic and policy literatures to identify key 
themes and challenges, and conducted semi-structured interviews with senior 
regulators from the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the UK’s Medicines and 
Healthcare Regulatory Agency (MHRA), senior executives from industry with expertise 
on AMR (including drug/diagnostic firms and pharmaceutical trade associations and 
consulting firms); and an NHS consultant microbiologist on the practicalities of 
diagnosis and susceptibility testing. Where consent was given, interviews and meetings 
were recorded and transcribed. Otherwise, interview notes were used. All respondents 
requested anonymity, so we refer to respondents only by interview number. We focus 
here on 15 interviews from industry, given our interest in how commercial drug 
development is affected by policy and regulatory incentives and disincentives. We also 
conducted a ‘sensitivity analysis’ of the effect of different regulatory approaches on 
antimicrobial R&D costs (detailed later). We also had informal discussions (by phone, 
email, and at conferences) with venture capitalists. Their views were consistent with 
the 15 interviews, but are not a focus in this paper. We acknowledge some limitations of 
this data, specifically that our interviewees had an interest in achieving a higher price 
for antimicrobial drugs. However, given our aim to identify factors affecting industry’s 
interest in antimicrobials, it was important to focus on these actors.  
 
 
Background to AMR  
 
Das and Horton (2016) suggest AMR has become both fashionable and politically 
visible, but focusing on ‘resistance’ ignores the scarcity of antibiotics in some global 
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contexts, where mortality from poor access to effective antimicrobials is higher than 
that from resistant pathogens. Laxminarayan et al (2016) argue that policy must 
recognise the multiple and overlapping value(s) of antibiotics, which includes ‘option 
value’ (in the case of influenza pandemics they provide additional options for treatment 
as interactions between influenza and secondary bacterial infections are a major cause 
of death during pandemics); ‘enablement value’ (antimicrobials make surgical 
procedures safer) and ‘diversity value’ (new antimicrobials reduce selection pressures 
on existing drugs). This calls for a multilayered, evidence-based response. Although the 
link between overprescribing of antimicrobials and resistance appears obvious, many 
factors drive resistance, including low vaccine uptake, population density, sanitation, 
and migration/tourism (Holmes, 2016: 178).  
 
 Global dynamics highlight the socio-economic and political dimensions that 
cannot be disentangled from basic science and clinical norms. A UK report from an ESRC 
working group on AMR (ESRC, 2014) suggested effective responses to AMR require 
changes in social practices, including: ‘how regulatory and fiscal frameworks incentivise 
or deter antimicrobial development, production and use; and how public and healthcare 
professionals behave in relation to infection and use of antimicrobials’ (ESRC, 2014: 1). 
Drug development is only part of the solution, as antimicrobial ‘stewardship’ depends 
on normative social systems of negotiation involving prescribers, dispensers and 
patients/consumers. It also requires effective public engagement, where messages 
rooted in notions of catastrophe may indeed be counterproductive (Davis et al 2017). 
We focus on business models and economic incentives for developing antimicrobial 
drugs, but these are structured by socio-political contingencies, including dystopian 
narratives of security and trauma (Brown and Nettleton, 2016). Commercial viability of 
antimicrobials is also shaped by prescribing behaviours, transmission dynamics, 
regulatory/pricing structures, and underlying scientific complexity, which problematize 
technology foresight and crisis management.  
 
 Four factors explain the paucity of novel antimicrobial drugs. First, traditional 
antibiotic discovery methods, based on fermentation broths and extracts of soil-derived 
microorganisms, became difficult given: (a) a shift to target-based drug discovery by the 
pharmaceutical industry; and (b), the practical challenge of de-replication in natural 
product-based antibiotic discovery (Silver, 2011; Balz, 2007). Second, investment in 
genomics and target-based drug discovery failed to deliver viable broad and narrow-
spectrum antimicrobials (Payne et al, 2007, Silver, 2011). Third, regulatory guidelines 
previously made it difficult to undertake clinical trials, particularly for novel narrow-
spectrum antimicrobials (IDSA, 2011).  
 
Fianlly, newer antimicrobials do not generate large profits (Sertkaya et al, 2014), 
because they tend to be used in hospitals in patients with serious infections caused by 
pathogens resistant to older, cheaper generics. Most episodes of in-patient care in the 
US are reimbursed at a capitated rate where the payer provides a fixed fee for the 
‘episode of care’. Medicare Part A, for example, defines “Disease-Related Groups” 
(DRGs), such as a hip replacement or a coronary artery bypass graft, and pays a fixed 
fee based on the average cost of providing such an ‘episode of care’. If a patient 
contracts a serious infection requiring an expensive new antimicrobial, the hospital 
loses money on the patient. In contrast, specialist drugs used in the out-patient setting 
(e.g. cancer drugs), are reimbursed under Medicare Part B, which pays the treating 
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institution the average sales price (ASP) of the administered drug plus 4.3%. Outpatient 
drugs thus become profitable for the dispensing institution. The difference between 
DRG-based in-patient reimbursement (where novel antimicrobials are used) and ASP-
based out-patient reimbursement (where novel cancer drugs are used) explains why it 
is easier to commercialize new cancer drugs that cost $150k per course of treatment 
than new antimicrobials that cost $15k per course. Additionally, clinicians often hold 
back on prescribing new antimicrobials for ‘tough cases’ instead of basing decisions on 
treatment guidelines or lab testing, which exacerbates the commercialization challenge.  
 
In summary, novel and effective drugs that might have been discoverable were 
viewed by much of the drug industry as too difficult to develop given a market 
restricted by conservative stewardship in much of the developed world, and by the 
economics of drug choice in US hospitals.  
 
Impact of Clinical Trial Regulation on Antimicrobial Drug Innovation 
 
Onerous clinical trial requirements were previously considered by some academics, the 
drug industry, and the Infectious Disease Society of America (ISDA) as a barrier to 
antimicrobial drug innovation (Rex et al, 2013, IDSA 2011, 2014). This was confirmed 
in our interviews. IDSA suggested FDA guidelines in force in 2010 prioritized 
‘experimental purity’ over ‘clinical pragmatism’ such that it was impractical and 
unethical to recruit patients into antimicrobial trials (IDSA 2011, 2014). FDA guidance 
for hospital-acquired and ventilator–acquired bacterial pneumonia (HABP/VABP) 
required that prior use of antibiotics effective against the microbe presumed to be 
causing the infection be avoided in non-inferiority trials. The FDA argued that prior 
antibiotic use would reduce observable differences between the two treatment arms 
and bias conclusions. However, the IDSA contended this requirement made studies 
unfeasible as most trial participants would be selected from seriously ill hospitalized 
patients likely to have received prior treatment.  Subsequently, the 2014 guidance (FDA, 
2014) allowed enrolment of patients who had received up to 24 hours of treatment in 
the previous 72 hours. 
 
 Other regulatory challenges included shifting targets, statistical hurdles that 
demanded large trials, and situations where no trial design appeared satisfactory. 
Coates et al (2011) provide an illustrative example. Having agreed to a clinical trial 
protocol for the drug televancin (for HABP and VABP) using clinical response as the 
primary endpoint, the FDA requested further data to support an evaluation of ‘all-cause 
mortality’ as the endpoint. This increased cost of development, because it is more 
difficult to demonstrate a statistically robust survival effect of a drug than a clinical 
response. To simplify, deaths are rarer events than drug responses, and statistical 
power depends on the number of events during the trial. Furthermore, death depends 
on many factors, not just the drug, so signal to noise ratio is reduced, which requires 
larger trials. This paradoxical situation applied to anyone considering a trial for a novel 
antimicrobial against multi-drug resistant gram negative pathogens: ‘With no standard 
therapy [since these are multi-drug resistant pathogens], non-inferiority studies are not 
possible [as there is no commonly accepted standard treatment for the control arm]; 
historical controls are considered irrelevant and superiority studies are not ethical as 
patients cannot be randomized to ineffective therapy for infections with high mortality’ 
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(Coates et al, 2011: 191).  The point here is that it appeared impossible to satisfy 
regulatory guidelines in terms of trial design. 
 
Today, the FDA and EMA have adapted regulatory guidelines to enable practical 
and ethical trial designs. There have been statistical requirement changes that allow for 
smaller trials, and changes in recruitment criteria to simplify enrolment. Progress has 
also been made in reducing regulatory burdens for new drugs for patients with limited 
treatment options. Industry no longer considers regulation a significant barrier to the 
development of antimicrobial drugs, evidenced in our interviews:  
 
In broad terms, the regulatory environment has improved over the last 5 
years.  (Interview 1) 
 
The FDA and EMA have put in a lot of work. [Regulation] is not regarded 
as a major bottleneck. [We have] nothing yet in the clinic, but we could 
probably access the patients, testing etc. to run the trials we need to today 
if we had to (Interview 2) 
 
Regulatory adaptations to incentivise innovation are relatively recent. In 2013 and 
2014, the FDA issued guidelines for the development of drugs for several important 
classes of infection. These followed the Generating New Antibiotics Now (GAIN) 
provisions of the FDA Safety and Innovation Act 2014, which provided guidance for the 
design and conduct of preclinical and clinical antimicrobial studies. The EMA issued 
similar guidance (EMA, 2011; EMA 2013) to allow for flexibility in the development 
paths and labelling for novel antimicrobials for unmet medical need. Pathogen-specific 
approval for serious infections with few treatment options was particularly innovative. 
For the first time, patients in clinical trials could be pooled, when their infections were 
at different anatomical locations, if they shared a common infectious agent. Such trials 
can demonstrate a positive risk-benefit profile against the pathogen, without having to 
prove definitively that the drug has a positive profile for each particular infection 
caused by the pathogen. This made it cheaper to run trials for rare pathogens, or those 
with rare resistance profiles (Rex, et al, 2013).  
 
Tiered Labelling for Antimicrobial Agents and the Impact of Regulation on R&D 
Investment Cost Scenarios  
 
The tiered labelling of antimicrobial agents illustrated in Table 1 summarises these 
regulatory changes. Although our terminology is slightly different from that used by the 
FDA and EMA, which does not officially use tiered labelling, the classification maps 
current guidance from both agencies.   
 
Table 1. Tiered Labelling Framework for Antibacterial Agents (adapted from Rex et al, 
2013, our additions in bold) 
 
Typical efficacy data requirements How the drug would be marketed 
Tier A: Two standard phase 3 trials of 
drug X in infection Y. Additional 
indications for drug X can be added after 
single phase 3 studies 
Drug X is indicated for treatment of 
infection Y when proven or strongly 
suspected to be caused by drug X-
susceptible strains of [list of pathogens].  
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Tier B: One standard Phase 3 trial of drug 
X in infection Y, plus small prospective 
studies and descriptive data focused on 
the tier C pathogen(s) in a range of 
standard infections 
Drug X is indicated for treatment of 
infection Y and [list of studied infections 
from tier C database] when proven or 
strongly suspected to be caused by drug 
X-susceptible strains of [list of 
pathogens]. 
 
Because data for drug X in these infections 
are limited, drug X should be used only if 
other alternatives are known or suspected 
to be less suitable 
Tier C. Small prospective studies for drug 
X and descriptive data focused on the tier 
C pathogen(s) in a range of standard 
infections 
Drug X is indicated for treatment of 
infection Y [list of studied infections from 
tier C database] when proven or strongly 
suspected to be caused by drug X-
susceptible strains of [list of pathogens]. 
 
Because data for drug X in these infections 
are limited, drug X should be used only if 
other alternatives are known or suspected 
to be less suitable 
Tier D. Animal studies Drug X is indicated for the emergency 
treatment of infection Y caused by 
susceptible strains of organism Z 
 
Drug X should not be used for infection Y 
unless other options are unavailable. 
 
The table shows four ‘tiers’ of approval. Tier A corresponds to conventional standards 
for which most antibiotics have been approved, but also reflects recent adaptations that 
have made clinical trials viable. For Tier A, the clinical trial is structured to support 
approval for use of ‘drug X’ in ‘infection Y’, (e.g. community or hospital acquired 
pneumonia). The sponsor must run specific clinical trials to show drug X has a positive 
risk-benefit profile in each infection for which the drug can be marketed. Thus, if novel 
drug X is to be marketed for use in hospital-acquired (VABP/HAPB) and community-
acquired pneumonias (CAP), three trials are required; two for the initial VABP/HAPB 
indication and one for the additional CAP indication.  
 
Tier C represents the important regulatory change of pathogen–specific approval (such 
as MRSA or highly resistant gram-positive anaerobes), which can be granted on 
tentative evidence from infections across multiple anatomical locations. Tier D is 
approval without human efficacy trials. This can be approved for cases where efficacy 
trials would be either unethical or unfeasible, which occurred in 2012 when the FDA 
approved raxibacumab, a monoclonal antibody for treatment of inhalation anthrax, 
solely on animal studies using the FDA’s ‘Animal Rule’ (Tsai and Morris, 2015). The 
drug was destined for a US stockpile of agents to combat potential bioterrorism, so this 
is an example of regulatory innovation being adopted as part of a securitisation agenda. 
The FDA’s Animal Rule has resulted in the approval of approximately one product per 
year since its inception in 2002, and over half of these are for bacterial infections. Tier B 
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applies to any drug that has robust efficacy data for one infection such as pneumonias, 
but more limited data for other infections (a hybrid of Tiers A and C). 
 
Implications of Tiered Approval for R&D Costs: ‘Sensitivity analysis’ 
 
We have estimated the effect of new approval routes on expected costs of antimicrobial 
R&D. Before we present the detail, we note some general points about drug R&D cost 
estimates.  
 
First, R&D costs have been contested as the drug industry has used them to 
justify high prices. Scannell (2015) argues this has led to undue criticism of what are 
relatively straightforward analyses (see also Scannell et al. 2015). For our purposes, we 
assume that pharmaceutical firms are not committing systematic accounting fraud by 
misreporting their R&D costs, and that it is possible to triangulate on industry R&D 
costs from public sources (e.g., FDA drug approvals and audited financial accounts of 
drug companies). Specifically, we assume that the cost of individual activities in 
antimicrobial drug development correspond broadly with those set out by Sertkaya et 
al. (2014). We also note that these cost estimates are consistent with the R&D 
investments made by stand-alone biotechnology companies developing antimicrobials, 
such as Polyphor and Archaogen.   
 
Second, drug R&D in general has the economics of a lottery, albeit one that plays 
out slowly (Grabowski and Vernon,1990; Grabowski et al, 2002; Scannell, 2015). Most 
projects fail, and those that succeed take time to complete. Thus the attractiveness of 
drug R&D to commercial investors who fund most clinical development is sensitive to 
their view of: (1) the probability that a given project will be a technical success; (2) the 
out of pocket (OOP) costs of individual clinical development activities; (3) the project’s 
commercial prospects; and (4) the time cost of money (generally calibrated against 
other projects perceived to carry similar levels of financial risk).  
 
Third, private sector actors have different views on factors (1) to (4). A company 
with robust pre-clinical toxicity data might assign a higher probability to ultimate 
approval than a company whose pre-clinical toxicity data looks marginal. A company 
whose drug shows low levels of cross-resistance with other antimicrobials, and whose 
drug shows high barriers to the evolution of resistance, may have high commercial 
expectations. Different companies invest, or not, accordingly.  
 
Given these considerations, our assessment of the R&D cost implications of Tiers 
A, C and D pathways (Table 2) should be regarded as a ‘sensitivity analysis’, where the 
relative differences in cost estimates are more informative than absolute numbers. 
Given these caveats, and using Sertkaya’s estimates for the Tier A path for HABP/VABP 
and CABP- including the cost of failed projects and time cost of money of 11% (Paul et 
al, 2010) - we get expected R&D costs of $1.6bn and $2.2bn respectively.  It is probable 
that the costs per Tier C approval for a narrow spectrum agent would be nearly two-
thirds less ($752m), while a Tier D approval would cost a tenth as much. If we ignore 
the cost of failure and the time cost of money – something that commercial R&D funders 
are unlikely to do at the point at which they decide whether or not to fund the project – 
the cost differential narrows. The Tier A path for HABP/VAPB and CABP would cost 
$150m and $81m, with Tier C costing $111m, and Tier D costing $37m.   
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Table2: R&D Investment Scenarios for New Antimicrobial Drugs (Cost in 2012 US $) 
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Preclin PI PII PIII
NDA/BLA 
sub.
Total R&D
HABP / VABP with conventional regulatory route
Phase duration (years ) 5.5 0.9 1.5 3.3 0.8 12
Time to commercia l  launch (years ) 12.0 6.5 5.6 4.1 0.8
Phase midpoint vs . launch (years ) 9.3 6.1 4.9 2.5 0.4
Real  cost of capita l 11% 11% 11% 11% 11%
Time cost of money vs . launch 2.6 1.9 1.7 1.3 1.0
OOP cost per success ful  candidate $m 21.1 9.7 15.6 101.4 2.0 150
Capita l i zed cost per success ful  candidate $m 55.4 18.1 25.9 130.9 2.0 232
Phase success  probabi l i ty 35% 33% 50% 67% 85%
Candidates  required per success ful  launch 30.2 10.6 3.5 1.8 1.2
OOP cost including R&D fa i lures  $m 637.4 102.7 54.9 178.0 2.3 975
Capitalized cost including R&D failures $m 1673.7 193.1 91.1 229.9 2.4 2190
Memo item: Total market size ($m) 3470
Memo item: private ENPV of project ($m) -4
CABP with conventional regulatory route
Phase duration (years ) 5.5 0.9 1.3 1 0.8 9.5
Time to commercia l  launch (years ) 9.5 4 3.1 1.8 0.8
Phase midpoint vs . launch (years ) 6.8 3.6 2.5 1.3 0.4
Real  cost of capita l 11% 11% 11% 11% 11%
Time cost of money vs . launch 2.0 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.0
OOP cost per success ful  candidate $m 21.1 9.7 9.1 38.8 2.0 81
Capita l i zed cost per success ful  candidate $m 42.6 14.0 11.8 44.5 2.0 115
Phase success  probabi l i ty 35% 33% 50% 67% 85%
Candidates  required per success ful  launch 30.2 10.6 3.5 1.8 1.2
OOP cost including R&D fa i lures  $m 637.4 102.7 32.1 68.2 2.3 843
Capitalized cost including R&D failures $m 1289.3 148.8 41.4 78.1 2.4 1560
Memo item: Total market size ($m) 7940
Memo item: private ENPV of project ($m) 37
Narrow spectrum agent (e.g., activity limited to Psuedomonas aeruginosa)
Phase duration (years ) 5.5 0.9 3.3 3.3 0.8 10.5
Time to commercia l  launch (years ) 10.5 5.0 4.1 4.1 0.8
Phase midpoint vs . launch (years ) 7.8 4.6 2.6 2.6 0.4
Real  cost of capita l 11% 11% 11% 11% 11%
Time cost of money vs . launch 2.2 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.0
OOP cost per success ful  candidate $m 21.1 9.7 10.4 67.6 2.0 111
Capita l i zed cost per success ful  candidate $m 47.3 15.5 13.6 88.2 2.0 167
Phase success  probabi l i ty 69% 54% 50% 67% 85%
Candidates  required per success ful  launch 9.4 6.5 3.5 1.8 1.2
OOP cost including R&D fa i lures  $m 198.7 62.8 36.6 118.7 2.3 419
Capitalized cost including R&D failures $m 446.2 100.9 47.8 154.9 2.4 752
Drug that cannot be prospectively tested in man
Phase duration (years ) 5.5 0.9 0.8 7.2
Time to commercia l  launch (years ) 6.3 1.7 0.8
Phase midpoint vs . launch (years ) 3.6 1.25 0.4
Real  cost of capita l 11% 11% 11%
Time cost of money vs . launch 1.4 1.1 1.0
OOP cost per success ful  candidate $m 25.3 9.7 2.0 37
Capita l i zed cost per success ful  candidate $m 36.6 11.0 2.0 50
Phase success  probabi l i ty 25% 100% 100% 100% 85%
Candidates  required per success ful  launch 4.7 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
OOP cost including R&D fa i lures  $m 119.1 11.4 0.0 0.0 2.3 133
Capitalized cost including R&D failures $m 172.5 12.9 0.0 0.0 2.4 188
Tier C Approval Scenario
Tier D Approval Scenario
Tier A / Conventional Approval Scenarios (Sertkaya, et al., 2014)
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Sources: (Sertkaya, et al., 2014), (Rex, et al., 2013), and project team analysis and estimates 
 
 
Table 2 shows that the R&D process for HARB/VABP takes 12 years from the start of 
preclinical studies to drug launch (top panel). The direct OOP cost for a molecule that 
successfully completes the entire process is $150m. However, if we include the cost of 
failures (30 preclinical programmes were required to yield one successful molecule) 
and the cost of capital in the pre-launch years (between 9.5 and 12 years of 
development) then the total capitalized cost of R&D at time of launch is $2,190m per 
drug. Furthermore, the HABP/VABP market is small, so investment returns are 
generally poor. The R&D process for CABP is marginally less expensive. It takes 9.5 
years from the initiation of preclinical studies to drug launch (bottom panel), as the 
clinical trials are quicker. The direct OOP cost for a molecule that successfully negotiates 
the process is approximately $81m, due to lower phase 3 trial costs. Adding the cost of 
failures and of capital, the total capitalized cost of R&D by time of launch is $1,560m. 
The CABP market is also larger, so investment returns are at least higher than the cost 
of capital.  
 
 Those unfamiliar with drug investment might be surprised that the difference in 
capitalized R&D cost between the two scenarios does not emerge from different unit 
costs for phase 3 trials ($101m for HABP/VABP and $38.8m for CABP), but from the 
time cost of money. The CABP trials take less time than the VABP trials, so the OOP 
preclinical costs of $637m (identical for both programmes) have a capitalized cost of 
$1,673m in the case of HABP/VAPB, but only $1,289m in the case of CABP. We note that 
most of the OOP costs in both scenarios follow from transition probability assumptions 
that require 29 failed preclinical programmes for each drug that reaches market 
(‘candidates required per successful launch’ in Table 2). Assuming higher probability of 
success for each project, expected costs for each approved drug would be lower. These 
analyses are sensitive to failure rate assumptions, which in turn are sensitive to the 
quality of preclinical drug candidates, their novelty (Porges, Shi, and Pancratov, 2014), 
and the diagnostic tests available to enrich clinical trials for patients with pathogens 
sensitive to the drug. For example, for the $2.2bn Tier A estimate, the direct spending on 
the single drug that finally reached the market was only $232m, or just 11% of the 
average R&D spend per new approved drug.  
  
 Figure 1 illustrates the HABP/VABP scenario in Table 2, but varies the joint 
preclinical and phase 1 transition probability (the probability that a drug passes both 
phases) and the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). It shows the expected value 
of R&D investment required per drug approved varying by a factor of 4 as we change 
the probability of success of preclinical and phase 1 trials. Cost of capital assumptions, 
which vary the time cost of money, are also important but less so within the 9% to 23% 
range we have examined.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: R&D Cost Estimate’s Sensitivity to Transition Probability Assumptions 
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 Looking now at Tier C regulations (Tables 1 and 2), it is much cheaper to run 
clinical trials for narrow-spectrum agents, which have higher success rates for several 
reasons. First, they are easier to discover given current technological capabilities, so 
there are more viable candidates to select for clinical trials. Second, there are plausible 
scientific reasons to expect them to be less toxic to humans than broad spectrum 
candidates. Sertkaya et al (2014) used concerns about toxicity to justify the low success 
rates of broad-spectrum drugs in preclinical and phase 1 trials. One interviewee argued 
that many broad-spectrum antibiotics have ‘promiscuous’ and ‘messy’ target binding 
profiles (they have to bind to a family of homologous but slightly different target 
proteins in various micro-organisms), which increases human toxicity (Interview 4). 
Third, narrow spectrum drugs have benefits with regard to resistance patterns: 
 
There are huge benefits from the perspective of evolution of resistance if 
you use narrow spectrum agents. With broad spectrum agents, every bug 
in the patient is exposed to a selective pressure. With narrow spectrum 
agents, most bugs in the patient are not exposed to any selective pressure. 
There is also much less chance of horizontal acquisition of resistance (i.e. 
cross species DNA transfer) … narrow spectrum agents should have a 
much longer useful life (Interview 5) 
 
Our cost sensitivity analysis suggests that regulatory changes have created an 
environment more conducive to the successful clinical development of novel, narrow-
spectrum antimicrobial drugs.  
 
Financial/Market Barriers to Antimicrobial Drug Development 
 
Our research suggests that other factors are hindering antimicrobial drug development: 
(1) the viability of markets; and (2) interactions between rapid pathogen identification 
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(through diagnostic innovation) and resultant impact on clinical trials costs for narrow-
spectrum drugs. 
 
Attractiveness of Markets and the ‘Average’ Drug 
 
Industry interviewees identified the lack of market incentives as the main barrier to 
antimicrobial innovation: 
 
[The] problem is a lack of clarity on commercialization route and pricing. 
No-one has yet got an antibiotic to market with modern ‘orphan’ type 
pricing. Even [the most] expensive antibiotics have never cost more than 
around $5000 per treatment [some new antibiotics are now $15,000]… 
this is not an easy problem given payer resistance and the way different 
kinds of drugs are reimbursed. Most antibiotics for serious infections are 
prescribed within the hospital setting and are not reimbursed separately 
from the rest of the treatment episode [unlike most cancer or orphan 
drugs] (Interview 6) 
 
 
Prevailing norms of reimbursement mean novel antimicrobials prescribed within a 
hospital will never achieve the profits that have made other niche drug markets 
attractive for R&D investment. Furthermore, new antimicrobials will be reserved for 
patients that have failed to respond to existing drugs, reinforcing market failure.  
 
 Much attention has been given to this ‘incentive problem’ (Sciarretta et al, 2016; 
HOC, 2014; Sertkaya et al, 2014), and the following points arise from our analysis. First, 
we should be wary of analyses of the attractiveness of antimicrobial R&D based on 
historic average costs, probabilities, and sales, because R&D investment decisions are 
not predominantly driven by these factors, but by assessment of future costs, 
probabilities, and sales. Furthermore, financial returns on R&D at the project level are 
rarely ‘average’, and there is evidence that returns are highly variable and skewed 
across therapy areas (DiMasi and Grabowski, 2012; Scannell et al, 2015). Most projects 
lose money, and a small proportion of projects generate much of the value for the 
company. Nobody knows a priori which projects will be successful (Chia, Rifai and 
Sarraf, 2013).  
 
Second, estimates of R&D returns to firms and investors are sensitive to these 
actors’ estimates of R&D success rates and future market potential.  Such actors rarely 
consider themselves ‘average’, particularly when they see promising new technologies 
(e.g. rapid diagnostic testing) to support highly selective antimicrobials. Third, returns 
on incremental investment change during R&D. For investors in early stage drug 
discovery, the expected cost of the entire R&D process, including failures, is salient. The 
investment’s attractiveness is shaped by the fact that profits will not accrue for many 
years, as our analysis in Table 2 illustrates. However, specific decisions on incremental 
investment during the R&D process are different. ‘Surviving’ drug candidates acquire 
higher value as they move through development. When the decision comes to initiate 
phase 3 trials, much of the R&D costs have been sunk, but potential profits are 
imminent. Profit margins too narrow for investment in early stage drug discovery 
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activities now look attractive when relatively modest investment will likely bring a late-
stage candidate to market. 
 
From 2012-1014, the FDA granted 40 antimicrobial drug candidates ‘orphan-
like’ Qualified Infectious Disease Products (QIDP) status (Woodcock, 2014). According 
to our respondents, money is being invested in antimicrobials by a number of 
companies (Cubist, Durata, Bayer, Aradigm, Actelion, and Merck). Among firms we 
interviewed, the dominant view was that money was being invested in hope that 
incentives would improve and clinical trials for narrow spectrum agents would become 
cheaper and less prone to failure. If new incentives do not materialise, and diagnostics 
do not improve, many believed R&D investment would stall. 
 
Diagnostic Innovation and Narrow-Spectrum Antimicrobial Drug Trials 
 
 
Current enthusiasm for narrow-spectrum antimicrobial drugs rests on the assumption 
that clinical trials can be run more quickly and cheaply. This requires the availability of 
appropriate diagnostic tests: 
 
There is a huge economic complementarity between rapid diagnostics 
and antimicrobial drug R&D. The need to pre-treat severely ill patients 
with a broad-spectrum agent while waiting for conventional microbial 
identification means that trials are bigger, noisier, more expensive. If you 
really could do rapid diagnosis …  you could run the antibiotics trials 
much more like some of the recent anti-cancer drug trials; fewer patients 
recruited, better signal to noise ratios, hence easier and more profitable 
R&D (Interview 7) 
 
This reflects the need to improve systems for managing patients in hospitals and clinical 
trials. Many respondents hoped that development of routine diagnostic tools and 
services could shift narrow-spectrum agents into more widespread use, which would 
create commercial opportunities without an unacceptable increase in AMR.  
 
 Our research uncovered four factors that impact on diagnostic innovation for 
antimicrobials: (1) the ability of diagnostic tools to fit into existing health system 
workflows and practices; (2) the ability of diagnostic tools to fit into existing health care 
budgets; (3) the scale economics of laboratory supply and (4) the cost of validating 
diagnostics for rare diseases. The first three have an indirect effect in that they reduce 
clinical adoption, which affects financial incentives for R&D investment. 
 
In terms of health system workflows, one respondent observed that the ideal in 
vitro diagnostic (IVD) is ‘boring’, in that it should provide new information but not 
affect how physicians or health system operate. It is easy for health systems to 
substitute a better antibiotic for an older, less effective one. However, diagnostic 
technologies are more likely to require changes to conventional healthcare pathways 
and clinical practices. If they change workflows, even by adding just 5 minutes to a 
consultation (Interview 8), they are less likely to be clinically adopted. This applies to 
diagnostic testing for microbes as a precursor to providing narrow-spectrum 
antimicrobials in both hospital and community settings. If the constraint prevents more 
 14 
effective treatment of disease, one regulatory solution might be to require doctors to 
administer a diagnostic test before prescribing antimicrobials.  
 
 In budgetary terms, success of IVD innovation depends on who pays for the test 
and how much it costs. For example, tools that save money in health systems may 
simply shift payment from one budget to another. Primary care physicians may be 
reluctant to use relatively cheap point of care tests, if they are paid from their own 
budgets and if similar results could be provided more slowly by sending specimens to a 
laboratory, where costs fall within another budget. Our interviewees suggested 
reimbursement, access, and adoption are challenges for diagnostic companies. New 
tests can also increase costs if health systems must continue running older services 
during transition. 
 
National differences in price sensitivity and procurement processes for 
diagnostics also add complexity. In the US, physicians are often self-employed 
entrepreneurs, insensitive to the price of diagnostic tests that are paid for by the 
hospital/insurance company, but sensitive to the risk of litigation if they under-test. 
European physicians are often employees working within fixed budget systems. A 
specific test might benefit from pricing and reimbursement in one country, but not 
another. In the UK, one respondent stated: 
 
The NHS insists on proving cost effectiveness. What this means is they 
expect the diagnostics firm to pay for a big study in various UK hospitals 
before they think about buying anything. However, it sometimes costs you 
more to prove to the NHS that your test is cost effective than you would 
ever make from the test if the NHS became your customer (Interview 8) 
 
In the US, there is the additional challenge of proving ‘clinical utility’ for reimbursement. 
How does one prove that the use of a diagnostic, a priori, and its companion drug 
results in better, more cost-effective outcomes versus the prescription of an ‘off the 
shelf’ broad-spectrum antibiotic with routine diagnostic testing and second line 
antibiotic treatment as back-up? 
 
These factors highlight the challenge of incorporating new activities or costs into 
complex health systems. Another factor relates to the economics of the IVD industry and 
laboratory practices, which discriminate against particular types of test. Complex tests 
that are rarely used are difficult to integrate into laboratory workflow and are 
unattractive to manufacturers. For example, for oncology drugs and their companion 
diagnostics, the diagnostics are cross-subsidised by the drug, which is the only way that 
IVD companies make money. The diagnostic only makes commercial sense where it 
supports the sale of an expensive cancer drug, and the drug company pays for the 
development of the test and its clinical use. Similar cross subsidies allow the health 
system to administer the test: 
 
Panels of molecular tests often end up being costly [to administer], 
particularly if you are looking for relatively rare diseases. To give an 
example, in lung cancer, the drug crizotinib works very well in the 5% of 
lung cancer patients with an ALK mutation. That means you have to test 
20 patients to get a single positive. Even if each test is only 500 euros [to 
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the health system], this means you spend 10,000 euros per patient 
detected.  The expectation is that the drug company ends up paying for 
the companion diagnostic (Interview 9) 
 
The problem in the case of IVDs for rare pathogens, or rare forms of AMR, is that unlike 
the case of cancer treatment, there is no ‘blockbuster’ antimicrobial drug to subsidise 
the development costs of the diagnostic and its administration. 
 
 Finally, costs associated with the validation of tests for rare diseases are 
important given that most types of AMR are rare. Statistical assessment of test quality is 
both more complex and less familiar to most people than the assessment of drug 
efficacy. Many believe a clinical trial proves a drug ‘works’ if the difference in outcome 
between patients who received the drug and those who did not is ‘statistically 
significant’ at the p <0.05 level. However, there is no simple rule to prove a diagnostic 
works (Greiner, Pfeiffer, and Smith, 2000). For most diagnostic tests, it is important that 
vendors, customers, auditors, and regulators understand at least four parameters: 
sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value, and negative predictive value. The first 
two are intrinsic attributes of the test. The others depend on context of use. The test’s 
usefulness depends on the acceptable trade-offs between these parameters. In general, 
if sensitivity rises, specificity falls. If the disease is severe and the diagnostic test 
expensive, while the curative drug is safe and cheap, one might be willing to accept false 
positives from the test, but would be concerned about false negatives, as the following 
account illustrates: 
 
When you have multiplexed tests [a panel of tests for different pathogens 
run simultaneously using the same test kit and machine] the cost of 
validation [in R&D] goes up. So consider a panel of test for sepsis. 
Practically any bacteria can cause sepsis in certain patients. Technically, 
we could easily make a panel of 100 yes/no PCR tests. However, it is only 
the 10 most common pathogens that you encounter frequently enough to 
effectively validate the tests. With the very rare pathogens you cannot 
estimate your false positive and false negative rates without testing an 
inordinately large number of samples, the overwhelming majority of 
which will be negative. Importantly, AMR is still relatively rare and 
specific mechanisms of resistance are often very rare. Therefore, broad 
panels of PCR-based tests for resistant bugs will be expensive to validate 
(Interview 10). 
 
Together, these factors highlight continuing challenges that inhibit commercial 
development and delivery of effective antimicrobial drugs and diagnostics to the clinic.  
 
Conclusion 
 
We have analysed the role of regulation in incentivising or inhibiting the commercial 
development of new antimicrobial drugs and diagnostics to address the global AMR 
challenge, and other market factors that make such innovation unattractive to the 
pharmaceutical industry - reimbursement and the complexities of diagnostic testing for 
narrow spectrum agents. Clinical norms and practices have a significant negative impact 
on new antimicrobial drug development, and regulatory changes can support the R&D 
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process. Commercialization challenges for new antimicrobial drug development are 
clearly not new, particularly on reimbursement. Most hospital use of antibiotics for 
serious infections is either paid from a fixed hospital budget, or else reimbursed on a 
DRG-basis. In both cases, institutions have a financial interest in using established 
antibiotics, which are now almost always generic and cheap.  However, new 
stewardship concerns have a compounding effect on the economics of antimicrobial 
innovation.  
 
In conclusion:  
 
(1) Given the scarcity of broad-spectrum antimicrobial agents, accurate and 
rapid IVDs to detect the nature of the infectious agent and its susceptibility to 
narrow spectrum agents will become increasingly important. A new process 
will be required for these IVDs to enable co-development of the drug and 
diagnostic and a viable payment model.  
 
(2) There has been considerable regulatory adaptation to enable rapid and cost-
effective development of new antimicrobial drugs with social benefits, so 
regulation is no longer considered an important barrier to drug development.  
R&D costs per drug may have more than halved as a result of recent 
regulatory changes.  
 
(3) However, the lack of market incentives is inhibiting antimicrobial drug 
innovation; particularly issues around hospital practices, workflows, and 
diagnostic/therapy reimbursement. Rather than focus on historical R&D 
costs or current profits, it is important to satisfy investors and companies 
that investment in antimicrobial development today will provide acceptable 
returns in future.  
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